The first expresses the property of an object, . This is a fact at
a point in time or during some time interval. This state of affairs
may persist over several time-points, or exist at only one point in
time. Or it may be viewed as existing through some time-interval, and
cease to exist in the following.
The second expresses a property of an object, too. It states that Mary
is walking uphill.
A detailed analysis, using the ontology of GOL as a reference,
reveales the following: There is an individual process , the
movement of an object in upward direction (towards the top of the
hill). Mary is participating on this process
through her act of
walking,
. Now this participation-relation is a universal in GOL, say
. The state of affairs is formed by a relator
with
, the
process
and the activity that relates Mary to
,
. So the
state of affairs would be
.
This state of affairs may exist in a time-interval,
but not at a point in time
At sub-intervals of this time, Mary is still walking uphill,
so the state of affairs exists at any given sub-interval. Also, there
is no natural end-point of this activity, there is no culmination.
The third state of affairs is different from the second. There may be sub-intervals, where Mary is not climbing the hill. Also, there is an end-point, a culmination. But again, this state of affairs exists at a time-interval.
The fourth state of affairs is instantaneous, it can only exist at a point in time. It is inherently culminating, because the underlying process is.
The fifth state of affairs expresses a state. It exists during some time interval, but it makes no sense to ask, how long it lasted or whether it culminated.
There may be even more distinctions between states of affairs. We wanted to show, that states of affairs may be related in a variety of different ways to time. Also, they are neither only occurrents nor only endurants, they may be both. We may classify states of affairs by this distinction.
Some philosophers would disagree with us and deny, that states of affairs have a temporal extension. They would rather call those entities events, while states of affairs are the combination of objects at a point in time. Some philosophers like Ingarden would prefer to call some of the above relations between objects processes in a general sense, and only states of affairs of the fourth type ``events''. Others, like lombard or kim1 refer to events as special states of affairs. All discussion about events is mainly done under the question of causality. Events may be causes or effects of others. But then, the problem arises: ``Sometimes an event is described as the cause of some quality in an object [...], or as the cause of a state of affairs [...]. Sometimes, again, an object or state of affairs is described as the cause of a quality in an object, or as the cause of a state of affairs, or as the cause of some event; and there are perhaps other sorts of causally related pairs.''harris Some of these problems are avoided when events are regarded as states of affairs, or at least constituted by states of affairs. As we do not wish to discuss causality further, please be referred to riker for a good account of causality, that is close to our approach.
We subsume ``events'' (and ``processes'', in another
terminology) under states of affairs. ``Complex events'' involving
multiple states of affairs like ``the Second World War'' or a
``marathon'' do not exist in states of affairs, but rather in the
domain of situoids and situations. ``Primitive events'', like the
movement of an object from the spatial point
to
(or,
to use the proper GOL-terminology, the participation of the object
in the process consisting in the movement of an object from the
points
to
) or the
states of affairs in the beginning of this section exist in the domain
of states of affairs events.
This leaves us with the problem of distinguishing different kinds of states of affairs; there are instantaneous and enduring states of affairs, some, that exist at a single point in time, some that exist during some time interval. States of affairs have a temporal extension. Their temporal extension is the set of time points (or time boundaries) or time intervals at which they exist.
Now we can say, what instantaneous and enduring states of affairs are.
There may be two kinds of ambiguous states of affairs, without a
temporal extension and with time boundaries as well as time intervals
as a temporal extension. States of affairs without a temporal
extension may be viewed as abstract entities, or somewhere existing
outside of time, like, maybe,
. We believe that a
better interpretation is that this state of affairs exists throughout
all time. States of affairs, like
may be viewed as
existing at time points and time intervals. We rather believe, that
there are two different states of affairs with different relations,
one relating some property to an object at a point in time, another
relating this property over some time interval. We take on the point
of view that
there are no ambiguous states of affairs in reality.
Another distinction may be between static and
dynamic states of affairs; consider the states of affairs
and
, Kay's resting and Kay's
walking. The first involves a state, and no property is changed by
it, while the second inheres a change. Changes are ordered pairs of
instantaneous states of affairs. For a detailed discussion of
processes and how they can be used to classify infons, please be
refered to herre4.
We assume that pictural states of affairs are always wholly present at
a point in
time, at a time boundary. Therefore, infons are also
always wholly present at a point in time.
Infons, taking pictural states of affairs as constituting parts, may have another argument, specifying a time boundary or a time interval. This infon describes the information about presence or absence of a state of affairs at some time entity (boundary or interval).
Now we can extend the correspondence relation between infons and states of affairs to a timed correspondence.
Now we have a rich enough formalism to start our discussion of situoids and situations. But before we start this, we will have to make some remarks about features we omitted here, because they can only be fully understood in the domain of situations and situoids.
leechuck 2005-04-19